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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
            
 
SAROKIN, Circuit Judge: 
 Sylvan Associates, Inc. ("Sylvan" or "applicant"), the sole 
member of defendant Alpha Housing & Health Care, Inc. ("Alpha"), 
a nonprofit corporation, appeals from the denial of its motion to 
intervene as a third-party plaintiff in an action for breach of 
contract.  Sylvan wishes to argue that the contracts between 
plaintiffs and defendant were ultra vires, a claim that defendant 
itself is prohibited from raising under Pennsylvania law. 
 I. 
 Plaintiff Development Finance Corp. ("DEFCO") entered into a 
contract to assist defendant in arranging financing for the 
  
acquisition of nursing home facilities.  After defendant 
purchased two facilities, it entered into a contract with 
plaintiff The National Housing and Health Care Trust, Inc. 
("National Housing") whereby National Housing would assist in the 
management of the nursing homes.  DEFCO and defendant 
subsequently executed another contract providing for revised 
terms of payment for DEFCO's services.  DEFCO and National 
Housing now sue for defendant's alleged breach of the agreements.  
Federal jurisdiction for the original claims is based on the 
diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and defendant, 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332.   
   Sylvan first moved to intervene as of right as a defendant, 
in order to assert as a defense that the agreements between 
plaintiffs and defendant were ultra vires.  The district court 
denied the motion, Appendix ("App.") at 63, and Sylvan did not 
appeal. 
 Recasting its argument, Sylvan again moved to intervene as 
of right, this time as a third-party plaintiff, in an effort to 
enjoin performance of defendant's contracts with plaintiffs 
pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S. §5503(a)(1).  The action asked the 
district court to grant plaintiffs only "such compensation as may 
be equitable," as the Pennsylvania statute provides.  The 
district court denied the motion without a written decision.  
App. at 111.  Sylvan filed a timely notice of appeal, and we have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1291 because the denial of a motion 
to intervene as of right is a final, appealable order.  United 
  
States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 1179 (3d Cir. 
1994). 
 II. 
 We review the denial of a motion to intervene as of right 
for abuse of discretion.  Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1179; Brody 
v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 (3d Cir. 1992).  However, we will 
reverse "only if we find the district court 'has applied an 
improper legal standard or reached a decision we are confident is 
incorrect.'"  Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Brody, 957 
F.2d at 1115). 
 We must begin with a jurisdictional issue.  As the party 
asserting jurisdiction, Sylvan bears the burden of showing that 
its claims are properly before the district court.  Packard v. 
Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1045 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 114 S.Ct. 440 (1993). 
 Sylvan and Alpha are both incorporated under the laws of 
Pennsylvania.  It is axiomatic that the federal judiciary's 
diversity jurisdiction depends on complete diversity between all 
plaintiffs and all defendants.  See 28 U.S.C. §1332; Strawbridge 
v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); Singh v. Daimler-Benz 
AG, 9 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1993).  Sylvan concedes that there 
is no diversity of citizenship between itself and Alpha; both are 
Pennsylvania corporations.  Intervenor's Brief at 20.   
 Sylvan contends that the district court has supplemental 
jurisdiction over its claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a), the 
recent codification of common law "pendent" and "ancillary" 
jurisdiction.  Section 1367(a) provides 
  
 Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) . . . in any 
civil action of which the district courts have original 
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental 
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that 
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article 
III of the United States Constitution.  Such supplemental 
jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the joinder 
or intervention of additional parties. 
28 U.S.C.A. §1367(a) (1993). 
 A. §1367(b) 
 Subsection (b)'s limitation on the general grant of 
supplemental jurisdiction raises the most obvious problems for 
Sylvan:   
 In any civil action of which the district courts have 
original jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this 
title, the district court shall not have supplemental 
jurisdiction . . . over claims by persons . . . seeking to 
intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24, when exercising 
supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be 
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 
1332. 
28 U.S.C.A. §1367(b) (1993) (emphasis added).  Sylvan does not 
dispute that the district court's original jurisdiction was 
"founded solely on section 1332" and that Sylvan has captioned 
its motion as one to intervene as a plaintiff.  App. at 64.  At 
first glance, then, §1367(b) would appear to deprive the district 
court of jurisdiction over Sylvan's claim against Alpha. 
 District courts considering §1367(b) have generally 
concluded that in a diversity action, the section eliminates 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claims of a plaintiff-
intervenor who shares citizenship with a defendant.  See Deere & 
Co. v. Diamond Wood Farms, 152 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.Ark. 1993); 
  
Yorkshire Partnership v. Pacific Capital Partners, 154 F.R.D. 
141, 142 (M.D.La. 1993); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Logan 
Group, 848 F.Supp. 86, 87-89 (N.D.Tex. 1994); Manhattan Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Northwestern Regional Airport Comm'n, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6858 at *4 (W.D.Mich. March 25, 1993).  See also 
Krueger v. Cartwright, 996 F.2d 928, 933 n.6 (7th Cir. 1993) 
(§1367(b) would have deprived court of supplemental jurisdiction 
over claim of party who shared citizenship with defendant in 
diversity action, had party moved to intervene as plaintiff).   
 We are aware of only one case to the contrary.  See Colonial 
Penn Ins. Co. v. American Centennial Ins. Co., 1992 WL 350838 at 
*3-4 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).  
 Leading commentators generally agree that in a diversity 
action, §1367(b) eliminates supplemental jurisdiction over claims 
of plaintiff-intervenors who share citizenship with a defendant.  
See 7C Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary K. Kane, 
Federal Practice and Procedure, §1917 at 47 (1994 Supp.) (Section 
1367(b) "specifically prohibits the exercise of [supplemental] 
jurisdiction in diversity cases for persons seeking to intervene 
as plaintiffs under Rule 24"); 3B James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's 
Federal Practice ¶24.18 (2d ed. 1993), at 24-182 ("§1367(b) makes 
one change in prior practice by eliminating supplementary 
jurisdiction over a party who intervenes, even if by right, as a 
plaintiff in a diversity action if that party does not meet the 
requirements for diversity jurisdiction"); 28 U.S.C.A. §1367 
(1993), David Siegel, Practice Commentary, "The 1990 Adoption of 
  
§ 1367, Codifying 'Supplemental' Jurisdiction" ("Practice 
Commentary"), at 833. 
 1. Alignment 
 Before rushing to deny Sylvan's bid to participate in this 
action, however, we must consider a fundamental principle of 
federal jurisdiction, a principle associated with, but not 
limited to, diversity jurisprudence.  In determining the 
alignment of the parties for jurisdictional purposes, the courts 
have a "duty" to "'look beyond the pleadings and arrange the 
parties according to their sides in the dispute.'"  Indianapolis 
v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 69 (1941) (quoting Dawson v. 
Columbia Trust Co., 197 U.S. 178, 180 (1905)).  Opposing parties 
must have a "'collision of interests'" over the "'principal 
purpose of the suit.'"  Id. (quoting Dawson, 197 U.S. at 181 and 
East Tennessee, V. & G. R. v. Grayson, 119 U.S. 240, 244 (1886)). 
 In this circuit we have described the alignment inquiry as 
one which "obliges the court to penetrate the nominal party 
alignment and to consider the parties' actual adversity of 
interest."  In re Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. PCB 
Contamination Ins. Coverage Litigation, 15 F.3d 1230, 1240-41 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 291 (1994).  See 
also Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 
42, 46 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 In Texas Eastern, we determined that a district court had 
"erroneously reasoned that realignment was a principle associated 
exclusively with diversity jurisdiction."  15 F.3d at 1242 
(emphasis added).  Realignment "in fact represents a broader 
  
principle of judicial interpretation of statutes conferring 
jurisdiction in federal courts, where the statutory conferral of 
jurisdiction is predicated upon the adversarial relationship of 
the parties."  Id. at 1240.  Thus, "where party designations have 
jurisdictional consequences," we must align the parties before 
determining jurisdiction.  Texas Eastern, 15 F.3d at 1241 
(realigning partes for jurisdictional analysis under Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §1330).  See also Chicago, R. 
I. & P. R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574 (1954) (realigning parties 
for jurisdictional analysis under the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§1440). 
 Under §1367(b), party designations clearly have profound 
jurisdictional consequences.  In two recent cases we have noted 
the strikingly different treatment §1367(b) affords the claims of 
plaintiffs as opposed to those of defendants.  See Texas Eastern, 
15 F.3d at 1237-38; Janney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v. Shepard 
Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 1993).  See also Practice 
Commentary at 832 ("[§1367(b)] is concerned only with efforts of 
a plaintiff to smuggle in claims that the plaintiff would not 
otherwise be able to interpose . . . The repetition of the word 
'plaintiff' at several rule-citing junctures in subdivision (b) 
makes this clear").  Accordingly, we must align the parties 
before applying §1367(b). 
 The "principal purpose" of the suit by DEFCO and National 
Housing is to enforce their agreements with Alpha.  Both Alpha 
and Sylvan seek to set aside the agreements, paying at most the 
"equitable compensation" required by 15 Pa.C.S. §5503(a).  
  
Although Sylvan's claim nominally opposes Alpha, in fact the 
basic interests of Alpha and Sylvan coincide with each other and 
collide with those of DEFCO and National Housing over the 
principal issue of the case.  The "actual adversity of interest" 
pits Alpha and Sylvan against DEFCO and National Housing.  
Consequently, Sylvan must be aligned with Alpha as a defendant.  
Sylvan's motion to intervene should be treated as raising a 
cross-claim against Alpha and a counterclaim against DEFCO and 
National Housing. 
 2. Counterclaims and cross-claims of an intervenor-defendant 
 The plain language of §1367(b) limits supplemental 
jurisdiction over claims of plaintiffs against "persons made 
parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24," and of parties who join or 
intervene as plaintiffs pursuant to Rule 19 or 24.  28 U.S.C.A. 
§1367(b).  The section has little to say about defendants. 
 We have twice held that in a diversity action, the district 
court has jurisdiction over a defendant's counterclaim against 
non-diverse parties joined as third-party defendants to the 
counterclaim.  Texas Eastern, 15 F.3d at 1237-38; FDIC v. 
Bathgate, 27 F.3d 850, 874 (3d Cir. 1994).  In Texas Eastern we 
specifically pointed out that §1367(b) "by its terms" does not 
extend to a defendant's counterclaims, and further that the 
joinder of "non-diverse counterclaim defendants do[es] not 
destroy diversity jurisdiction . . . because there is complete 
diversity of citizenship between the original parties."  Texas 
Eastern, 15 F.3d at 1238. 
  
 Similarly, in Janney Montgomery Scott, an investment banker 
sued an obligor for breach of contract in a diversity action.  In 
holding that a co-obligor was not a necessary party to the 
action, we stated that if defendant moved to implead the co-
obligor on a claim for contribution, the district court would 
have supplemental jurisdiction, despite the common citizenship of 
the defendant/third-party plaintiff and the third-party 
defendant.  Janney Montgomery Scott, 11 F.3d at 412, n.15.   
 When faced by a party alignment very similar to the one 
here, the district court in Colonial Penn concluded that §1367(b) 
did not eliminate jurisdiction over a claim asserted by a non-
diverse intervenor against the original plaintiff.  The district 
court aligned the intervenor as a defendant though the party 
called itself a plaintiff, treated its claim as a counterclaim, 
and exercised jurisdiction.  1992 WL 350838 at *3-4.  See also 
Practice Commentary at 833 (suggesting §1367(b) does not 
eliminate supplemental jurisdiction over counterclaim raised by 
non-diverse defendant-intervenor). 
 We are aware of only one case in which a court considered 
the application of §1367(b) to a cross-claim by one co-defendant 
against another, non-diverse co-defendant, where federal 
jurisdiction over the original claims depended on §1332.  There, 
a district court held that §1367(b) does not eliminate 
supplemental jurisdiction.  Meritor Sav. Bank v. Camelback Canyon 
Investors, 783 F.Supp. 455, 457 (D.Ariz. 1991). 
 Considerations of judicial economy also counsel in favor of 
limiting §1367(b) to its plain language, rather than extending 
  
its jurisdictional bar to claims raised by intervening 
defendants.  Where an intervenor's claims are so entangled with 
the original claims and parties, banishing the non-diverse claim 
to state court would not serve the goal of judicial efficiency, 
 Finally, we have held that the 1990 Judicial Improvement Act 
codified the Supreme Court's treatment of ancillary jurisdiction.  
Texas Eastern, 15 F.3d at 1237-38 and n.7.  Extending §1367(b) to 
bar a counterclaim or cross-claim by an intervening defendant 
would contradict the pre-1990 common law of "ancillary 
jurisdiction," which encompassed counterclaims by a defending 
party pulled into court against his will, as well as claims by 
another person whose rights might be irretrievably impaired 
unless he could assert them in an existing federal court action.  
Owen Equipment and Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76 
(1978).  As discussed infra, applicant's rights could be 
irretrievably impaired if it is excluded from the instant 
proceeding. 
 We conclude that §1367(b) does not deprive the district 
court of supplemental jurisdiction over a counterclaim or cross-
claim raised by an intervening defendant, even where the 
intervenor shares citizenship with an original party. 
 B. §1367(a) 
 Turning to §1367(a) itself, the parties do not dispute that 
district court had original jurisdiction over the claims against 
Alpha brought by DEFCO and National Housing, pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1332.  We conclude easily that because the claims of 
DEFCO, National Housing, and Sylvan all concern performance of 
  
the agreements with Alpha, Sylvan's claims are "so related to 
claims in the original action . . . that they form part of the 
same case or controversy."  
 Having determined that (1) the jurisdictional principle of 
alignment applies to §1367(b); (2) proper alignment requires us 
to treat applicant as a defendant; (3) §1367(b) does not 
eliminate supplemental jurisdiction over a cross-claim or 
counterclaim raised by an intervening defendant; and (4) 
applicant has satisfied the elements of §1367(a), we conclude 
that a failure to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Sylvan's claims would be an abuse of discretion. 
 III. 
 Sylvan moved to intervene pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
24(a)(2).1  Rule 24(a) authorizes intervention where 
 (1) the application for intervention is timely; (2) the 
applicant has a sufficient interest in the litigation; (3) 
the interest may be affected or impaired, as a practical 
matter by the disposition of the action; and (4) the 
interest is not adequately represented by an existing party 
in the litigation. 
Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1181. 
                     
 
   1Rule 24(a)(2)  provides: 
 
 Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to 
intervene in an action . . . when the applicant claims an 
interest relating to the property or transaction which is 
the subject of the action and the applicant is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
represented by existing parties. 
 
  
 DEFCO and National Housing concede that Sylvan's application 
is timely and that it has an interest in the transactions which 
are the subject of the litigation.  Plaintiffs' Brief at 8.  To 
address the final two elements of Sylvan's proof, however, we 
must clarify the interest conceded by plaintiffs.   
 Sylvan asserts it has an interest "in maintaining Alpha's 
continued viability and tax exempt status in addition to insuring 
[sic] that Alpha acts in accordance with its corporate purposes 
and powers."  Intervenor's Brief at 11.  We agree that Sylvan 
shares with Alpha an interest in the latter's "continued 
viability," which may be threatened by specific performance of 
the contracts, as well as limiting Alpha to actions authorized by 
its charter and by-laws. 
 Regarding defendant's tax-exempt status, the same statute 
that confers the exemption also mandates that "no part of the net 
earnings of [the corporation] inures to the benefit of any 
private shareholder or individual."  26 U.S.C.A. §501(c)(3) 
(1988).  DEFCO is itself a nonprofit corporation, so its contract 
with Alpha may comply with the private inurement rule;  on the 
other hand, the text of the contracts may violate the rule.  See 
App. at 18, 21, 27-28.  We express no opinion on this ultimate 
issue, nor as to whether partial payment on the contracts 
violates §501(c)(3).   
 Sylvan also refers us to unspecified U.S. Department of 
Treasury regulations which may be implicated by Alpha's 
contracts.  In its Answer, Alpha invoked "OMB A-122."  App. at 
41.  We take this as a reference to Office of Management and 
  
Budget Circular A-122, "Cost Principles for Nonprofit 
Organizations," 45 Fed.Reg. 46022 (July 8, 1980).  Neither Alpha 
nor Sylvan refers to a particular passage in this lengthy 
document, but we note that the Circular mandates that only 
"reasonable" costs for professional services are allowable uses 
of certain government grants, contracts or awards.  Id., 45 
Fed.Reg. at 46023, 46031.  Presumably Alpha and Sylvan wish to 
argue that the agreements with DEFCO and National Housing provide 
"unreasonable" compensation for professional services, as the 
government defines "reasonable," and thus court-ordered payment 
of "unreasonable" compensation would violate the Circular.  We 
again express no opinion as to whether performance of the 
contracts has or would violate OMB Circular A-122.  Whether the 
threat arises under §501(c)(3) or OMB Circular A-122, we do agree 
that Sylvan has an interest in preserving defendant's tax 
exemption. 
 A. impairment of interest 
 We have held that the third element of intervention pursuant 
to Rule 24(a)(2) requires us to assess the practical consequences 
of the litigation.  Incidental effects on legal interests are 
insufficient; "rather, there must be 'a tangible threat' to the 
applicant's legal interest."  Brody, 957 F.2d at 1122-23 (quoting 
Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 601 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 947 (1987)).  We have also pointed out that the 
possibility of a subsequent collateral attack by an applicant 
will not preclude an applicant from demonstrating that his 
interest would be impaired, particularly in light of "our policy 
  
preference which, as a matter of judicial economy, favors 
intervention over subsequent collateral attacks."  Brody, 957 
F.2d at 1123. 
 The instant litigation presents a "tangible threat" to 
Sylvan's interest in the preservation of Alpha's tax exemption 
and in the corporation's continued viability.  Moreover, an 
adjudication of Alpha's obligations to DEFCO and National Housing 
could preclude Sylvan from maintaining a state court action 
pursuant to 15 Pa.C.S. §5503 to ensure that Alpha acts pursuant 
to its corporate powers and purposes.  Thus, Sylvan's legal 
interests could be impaired by disposition of the instant case. 
 B. Inadequacy of representation 
 Finally, an applicant has "'[t]he burden, however minimal . 
. . to show that his interests are not adequately represented by 
the existing parties.'"  Brody, 957 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Hoots 
v. Pennsylvania, 672 F.2d 1133, 1135 (3d Cir. 1982)).  
 In its Answer, Alpha does not defend on the grounds that its 
contracts with DEFCO and National Housing are void as illegal.  
App. at 40-42.2  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court applies "the 
general rule that an agreement which violates a provision of a 
statute, or which cannot be performed without violation of such a 
provision, is illegal and void."  American Ass'n of Meat 
Processors v. Casualty Reciprocal Exch., 588 A.2d 491, 495, 527 
Pa. 59, 68 (1991).  An illegal contract can never provide the 
                     
    
2Alpha does raise the defense of impossibility of performance 
because the "trust agreements" themselves prevent private 
inurement.  See Answer ¶38, App. at 41. 
  
basis for a cause of action: "The law when appealed to will have 
nothing to do with it, but will leave the parties just in the 
condition in which it finds them."  Id. (quoting Dippel v. 
Brunozzi, 74 A.2d 112, 114-15, 365 Pa. 264 (1950)).  Alpha is not 
barred from contending that the contracts violate §501(c)(3) or 
OMB Circular A-122, but its Answer does not set forth the 
defense.3   
 If the district court determines that Alpha's contracts 
violated §501(c)(3) or OMB Circular A-122, however, the contracts 
might still be enforceable; Alpha would simply lose its tax 
exemption.  Hence Sylvan wishes to argue that, even if not void 
as illegal, Alpha's contracts are voidable as unauthorized by its 
corporate charter or by-laws.  See, e.g., Bolduc v. Board of 
Supervisors, 618 A.2d 1188, 1190-91, 152 Pa.Commw. 248 (Pa.Commw. 
1992)(contract voidable when entered into by township acting 
beyond its corporate powers), appeal denied, 625 A.2d 1195, 533 
Pa. 662 (1993).  Alpha has not and may not raise the defense of 
ultra vires.  15 Pa.C.S. §5503; Downing v. School Dist., 61 A.2d 
133, 138, 360 Pa. 29, 40 (1948)("a corporation which has received 
and retained the benefits and advantages of a contract should not 
be allowed to escape its obligations upon a plea of ultra 
vires"); Wagner v. Somerset County Memorial Park, Inc., 93 A.2d 
                     
    
3Under the Pennsylvania and federal rules, illegality is an 
affirmative defense which must be pleaded, but under Pennsylvania 
law the defense is not waived by failure to plead it.  
Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030(a); American Ass'n of Meat 
Processors, 588 A.2d at 495-96. 
  
440, 442, 372 Pa. 338 (1953); American Mut. Liability Ins. Co. v. 
Bollinger Corp., 402 F.Supp. 1179, 1186 (W.D.Pa. 1975). 
 Sylvan alleges that defendant's charter empowers it to 
undertake only those activities permitted by §501(c)(3), and thus 
a transaction yielding private inurement would be ultra vires.  
See Motion to Intervene, App. at 71-72.4  See also By-Laws, 
Supplemental Appendix ("S.A.") at 143.  In addition, Sylvan 
alleges that the charter authorizes Alpha to pay only reasonable 
compensation for services rendered.  App. at 72.  See also By-
Laws, S.A. at 144. 
 Consequently, we conclude that Alpha has not and cannot 
adequately represent Sylvan's interests, as defendant has failed 
to raise the defense of illegality and is statutorily prohibited 
from arguing that the contracts are ultra vires.  In sum, Sylvan 
has satisfied its burden under Rule 24(a)(2), and it was an abuse 
of discretion to deny its motion for intervention. 
 IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons we will reverse the order of the 
district court and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                     
    
4The appellate record does not include the corporate charter. 
